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INCOME TAX LAW AND SLUMS: SOME
FURTHER REFLECTIONS
WALTER J. BLUM* and ALLISON DUNHAMt
The gravity of our slum problem requires that our various laws and
institutional arrangements be thoroughly examined to ascertain the extent
to which each unintentionally furthers the development and perpetuation of
slum conditions, especially among rental dwellings in urban areas. For this
reason, we are indebted to Arthur D. Sporn for his study, published in the
November 1959 issue of the Columbia Law Review, on "Some Contributions
of the Income Tax Law to the Growth and Prevalence of Slums."1 Much
has been written, particularly by enthusiastic campaigners for housing, on the
ways in which tax policy could be used to stimulate investment in urban
housing.2 What Sporn has done is to center attention more narrowly on those
aspects of our income tax policy that seem to him to have a propensity to
generate and maintain slums directly counter to our other government policies
designed to retard the growth of slums. Sporn is here on solid ground and
has performed a useful service. If a significant answer to our slum problem
is a government subsidy, there is little reason to expect the income tax law
to be a good vehicle for distributing and administering the subsidy. There is
even less reason to expect that in a campaign to eliminate slums, time might
profitably be spent dreaming up novel gadgets for incorporating a subsidy
into the tax law.
In performing this service, however, we believe Sporn has fallen into
error and has made proposals that are unlikely to assist in the drive against
slums and that clash with sound income tax policy. In Sporn's analysis the
chief villain in the income tax is our depreciation policy. There are four
separable but related elements involved.3 One is that in allocating costs
between nondepreciable land and depreciable improvements, the developer of
new housing is at a disadvantage compared with an investor in old housing.
This comes about, Sporn notes, because the expense of preparing land for
new construction is regarded by our tax law as a cost of land rather than
of the improvements placed upon it. The developer is trapped by his own
records, while the buyer of old housing is able to allocate his purchase price
between land and improvements in a more flexible manner. A second element
is that the relationship between the period for depreciation and the quality
of maintenance tends to be perverse. In the view of tax administrators, a bet-
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1. 59 COLUm. L. Rav. 1026 (1959).
2. For a discussion of some of these proposals see Blum & Bursler, Tax Subsidiesfor Rental Hou.ging, 15 U. CL L. REv. 255 (1948).
3. While Sporn does not state his points in quite these terms or order, we believe
that the analysis in the text states them fairly.
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ter maintained building has a longer estimated economic life than a less well
maintained structure; and so it appears that sound maintenance of rental
housing is penalized by a lengthening of the period over which invested capital
can be recovered through depreciation charges. A third element is the rela-
tionship between the recent liberalization of depreciation methods and the
capital gains provisions in the law. Under this relationship a write-off that
exceeds the reduction in market value amounts to an exchange of deductions
against ordinary income for a capital gain taxed at highly preferential rates.
This, Sporn asserts, encourages higher turnover of rental housing and under-
maintenance of the structures by each successive owner. The fourth element,
apparently the most potent, is the right of a purchaser of used rental housing
to predicate his total allowable depreciation on the price he paid for the struc-
ture rather than on the remaining undepreciated original cost. This right
exists today even though the aggregate depreciation deductions taken by suc-
cessive owners exceed the original investment in the structure and all subse-
quent improvements incorporated in it. When it is coupled with the fact that
under-maintained housing has a relatively short economic life for deprecia-
tion purposes, the result, according to Sporn, is that investors in old housing
get favorable depreciation treatment. The treatment is so favorable, he sug-
gests, that it largely nullifies the incentive to construct new rental housing
that was a principal objective of the recent change allowing investors in new
structures to employ accelerated methods of computing depreciation for tax
purposes.
From this analysis Sporn develops what is apparently a three-point
program for modifying the income tax law. First, he would allow demolition
and clearance costs to be added to depreciable structure (rather than compel
addition to the basis of nondepreciable land), or even permit complete
immediate write-off of these items as ordinary expenses. Second, he would
make the calculation of economic life for depreciation purposes independent of
the degree to which a structure was being maintained. Third, and most im-
portant, he would limit total depreciation charges to the original investment
(and subsequent improvements) in the structure, so that a purchaser of used
housing would be confined to taking depreciation on that part of the original
cost (and subsequent improvements) not recovered by previous owners.
On the surface all parts of this program might seem to be predicated on
the proposition that the existing tax law contributes to slum development by
favoring investment in old housing over investment in new units. But before
analyzing the impact of the tax law, we should note an assumption that
Sporn does not fully make apparent, perhaps for the reason that on this
matter our housing policy itself has been ambivalent. Generally Sporn seems
to assume that retardation of investment in new housing relative to investment
[Vol. 60:447
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in old fosters the spread or entrenchment of slums. Yet at some points in
his article he deplores the tendency of the tax law to encourage under-main-
tenance of old buildings, that is, to promote accelerated depreciation in the
physical sense. On the question whether national policy should be directed
toward investment in new housing and demolition of existing structures or
toward rehabilitation of decaying units, informed opinion is sharply divided,
and this division is reflected in the patchwork of laws and programs designed
to deal with inadequate and submarginal housing.4 There are those who believe
that the road to improvement lies in constructing new housing, and there
are those who think that, dollar for dollar of investment, greater urban
improvement is to be obtained by rehabilitation. The latter group includes
those who assert that if housing is in short supply (whatever that means)
the logical remedy can not involve reducing the total quantity of units in
existence. Probably the most that can be said about these two positions is
that under some conditions, apparently not easily susceptible of generalized
description, it is better to demolish and build anew, while under other cir-
cumstances, equally difficult of statement, emphasis on rehabilitation is
preferable.
We mention these differences in approach to slums not to take sides
but to note that on closer look Sporn's own analysis and program seem to
move in both directions somewhat inconsistently. Allowing land preparation
costs to be deducted currently or through depreciation is likely to induce more
new construction and demolition; while divorcing the depreciation period from
the level of maintenance seems likely to encourage repair of old structures.
(It might be added that present tax policy also has the effect of looking
both ways with respect to the debate about elimination of slum conditions,
and in this sense it may be neutral on the question of which way to solve
slum problems.) Apart from these possible inconsistencies, we question whether
Sporn's program would have the intended effect of inducing more construc-
tion of new rental housing. Undoubtedly the proposed limitation on total
depreciation would dampen investment in old structures and might thereby
make it cheaper for developers of new structures to acquire areas for de-
molition and rebuilding. But it does not necessarily follow that there would
be a corresponding increase in the flow of capital into new buildings. There
clearly is a relationship between the attractiveness of investment in new con-
struction and the market for used structures, insofar as resale potentialities
are a factor in assessing the risks and opportunities entailed in new building.
4. The Housing Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 888, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-30 (1958),
and the Housing Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 413, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1450-62 (1958),
particularly Title 1 on Urban Redevelopment, are thus predicated on a demolition program.
The Housing Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 590, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1450-60 (1958), called
the Urban Renewal Act, emphasizes rehabilitation.
1960]
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We know, for example, that the market for new owner-occupied housing is
highly sensitive to the second-hand market for single family dwellings. While
the relationship between new and used markets might be less significant in
the case of rental housing, the two are not wholly divorced. Under the
proposed depreciation cut-off, the distribution of investment within the rental
housing field might well shift in favor of new construction, but the total in-
vestment in rental housing might decline because investment in rental housing
would become relatively less attractive than alternative outlets for investment.
Whether or not the decline would be deep enough to reduce the level of new
construction, and so defeat the very purpose of the proposal, there is ample
room for skepticism about fighting slums with a ceiling on depreciation that
would tend to reduce total investment in rental housing.
In this connection it should be noted that not all parts of Sporn's
program would have such a tendency. There seems to be no way of predicting
the effects of his suggestion that the depreciation period be independent of
maintenance levels. Presumably investors in used housing would find better
maintained properties relatively more attractive than under-maintained struc-
tures. However, the impact of this suggestion on total investment in rental
housing would appear to depend on whether it would, on the average, lengthen
or shorten the period for recovering investment through depreciation. Nothing
inherent in it requires a change in the average period; and at best one can
only guess whether the tax administrators would bring about such a change
in the process of putting the suggestion into operation. As to Sporn's proposal
that land preparation costs be depreciable or immediately deductible, the
effect clearly would be to encourage more total investment in rental housing,
relative to alternative opportunities, because it would shorten the time for
recovering investment out of otherwise taxable income. The impact of this
part of his program, however, is likely to be minor compared to the con-
sequences of limiting total depreciation to original investment (plus subsequent
improvements). Thus on balance we must conclude that the net effect of
adopting the whole program would be adverse to investment in rental housing.
Having explored Sporn's program, we are ready to consider the analysis
that led him to conclude that the existing income tax laws generate and per-
petuate urban slums. The core of his reasoning is that investors are tempted
to buy used structures on small equities, squeeze out maximum revenues in
short periods during which depreciation is taken at rapid rates, and then sell
out, paying only the capital gains tax on the difference between their un-
recovered investment and the selling price. The buyer then starts this process
all over again on the basis of his cost.
We may assume for present purposes that this description is accurate and
typical for real estate transactions involving slum buildings; at least we all
[Vol. 60:447
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have observed enough of these transactions to agree that this happens. But
Sporn's position requires that he go further in his analysis and assert that it
is the income tax laws that tend to produce the resulting under-maintenance
and inadequate repair. Here he is in trouble, for in other real estate contexts the
same configuration of tax laws appears to aid in bringing about the opposite
result, that is, over-maintenance and generous repair. There are numerous
instances in which investors have purchased old buildings, apartment hotels
for example, upgraded them by making repairs and providing a higher level
of maintenance with dollars deductible from ordinary income, and then sold
them at profits taxable at capital gain rates. The elementary tax manuals make
no secret of the fact that under our tax laws real estate investment often offers
an opportunity for trading deductible maintenance costs now for capital gains
later. And where investors take advantage of this opportunity the tax laws
can hardly be said to contribute to the degeneration of rental housing.
How is it possible that the same set of tax laws seems to produce such
diverse results under different conditions? While we are not sure of the
answer, it would appear to us that the income tax depreciation and capital
gain provisions are rather neutral in the matter of encouraging or discourag-
ing slums, and that other factors relating to the demand for housing are much
more significant in the property owner's decision to upgrade or downgrade
his dwelling units. If there is a demand for upgraded dwelling units in old
structures, the income tax offers a bargain for the successful operator; and
if downgrading is the direction in which demand is tending, another form of
the same tax bargain is available to the winner. The impact of changes in
demand upon construction of new rental units as against construction of
single-family housing is well documented, 5 and there is no reason to believe
that this same change in demand has not affected maintenance decisions for
rental housing. However much the tax subsidy given to owner-occupied
housing has stimulated this change in demand, it does not appear that deprecia-
tion policy itself has played much of a role, if any, in determining which
standard of housing maintenance is more attractive in any particular rental
situation.
Wholly apart from whether Sporn's program is based on a sound analysis
or would further the fight against slums, we believe that in the main it would
be highly undesirable from a tax point of view. We agree that taxpayers
should not be permitted to transmute overly rapid depreciation into capital
5. In 1900, 35 out of every 100 newly constructed dwelling units were in structures
containing 2 or more such units; in 1927 the number was 43, but by 1955, during one
of the largest building booms in our history, only 9 out of each 100 new dwelling units
were rental units in structures of two or more units. See GREBLER, BLANK & WINNICK,
CAPITAL FORMATION IN RESIDENTIAL REAL EsTATE-TRENDS AND PROSPECTS table B-2
(1956); U.S. Housing & Home .Finance Agency, Housing Statistics, April 1957, p. 2;
WINNICK, RENTAL HOUSING: OPPORTUNITIES FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT 19-25 (1958).
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gain. This avenue of tax reduction is no more justifiable in the case of
improved real estate than it is in the case of any other variety of depreciable
assets, and its elimination would represent a step in the right direction in
straightening out the present capital gains jumble. Moreover, we do not
strongly take issue with Sporn's view that land preparation costs should be
added to depreciable building costs. It nmay well be that the assumption
that "land" is a nondepreciable item needs reexamination in our highly
urban society where what we have called "land" in the past is as much a part
of the consumable and nonsalvageable product as the elaborate marbles,
woods, and bricks put into buildings to make them merchantable. We know
that the nineteenth century gridiron pattern of streets, with twenty-five foot
lots on which buildings parallel with lot lines were located, was as much
consumed during the life of the buildings as the brick-row houses with marble
balustrades placed upon the lots. Who today can say that the now fashionable
whole block or area development, with no lot lines, few parallel buildings,
and irregular streets, will not be consumed as readily during the life of these
buildings as the modern decorative materials that they feature.
Sporn also suggests that the land preparation costs might be deductible
immediately as a business expense. This alternative to depreciation of the
land preparation costs needs greater exploration. Should the cost of preparing
land for, say, a parking lot be immediately deductible (even if the possibility
of commuting that deduction into a capital gain were blocked off) ? If we deny
the privilege in this situation, why should we grant it where improvements,
other than an office shack, are placed on the land? And if we are to discrim-
inate between the two situations, what should be the result where the preparer
of the land is not certain whether he will build an apartment house or a
parking lot?
It is at the point of placing a ceiling on depreciation deductions that we
definitely part company with Sporn. In our view a cardinal principle in
income taxation is to come as close as practicable to measuring the change in
economic position of taxpayers during the period for which the tax base is
being determined. Sporn's proposal would deny depreciation deductions to
owners of rental properties on their investments even though the structures
were losing value through use and the passage of time. Very likely Sporn is
accurate in his observation that present depreciation schedules for rental
buildings depart radically from expected economic lives. If so, the remedy
is to redefine the rules for arriving at realistic schedules rather than to impose
an arbitrary ceiling on total allowable depreciation deductions. It is both
unfair and unwise to deny depreciation to an owner of a building because
previous owners have recovered the original investment (plus subsequent
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improvements). Our income tax ultimately should be based on personal eco-
nomic experience and not on the experience of particular assets.
Nor should we forget that departures from measuring income on a per-
sonal (or family) basis invite consequences that frequently are unexpected
and sometimes difficult to counter. If a depreciation ceiling were imposed,
might not fully or largely depreciated rental housing gravitate into the hands
of taxpayers in low tax brackets? Certainly such properties would be less
attractive to high income than to low income owners. Indeed, might not these
properties tend to find their way into the portfolios of tax-exempt institu-
tions? Perhaps it will be urged that in this possibility lies the real hope that
Sporn's program will strengthen our arsenal for combating slums. History,
unfortunately, lends little support to that hope. Neither the rich, nor the poor,
nor the public service organizations have a specially enviable record in the
handling of their rental properties. In this connection it is not to be forgotten
that one of the first great legal controversies concerning government policy
on slum properties involved a public service organization. 6
6. Hecalth Dep't v. Rector of Trinity Church, 15 N.Y . 32, 39 N.E. 833 (1895).
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